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Abstract
We study optimal monetary policy in a ￿ exible state-dependent pricing framework, in
which monopolistic competition and stochastic menu costs are the only distortions. We
show analytically that it is optimal to commit to zero in￿ ation in the long run. Moreover,
our numerical simulations indicate that the optimal stabilization policy is ￿price stability￿ .
These ￿ndings represent a generalization to a state-dependent framework of the same
results found for the simple Calvo model with exogenous timing of price adjustment.
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Non-Technical Summary
A key normative question in monetary economics is one of the optimal design of monetary
policy in the presence of price stickiness. An extensive literature has studied this question
under the assumption that the timing of price changes is exogenously given. While this is a
useful ￿rst step, it is nonetheless subject to the criticism that the timing of price changes in
principle should not be treated as independent of policy.
We extend the analysis of optimal monetary policy to a model of ￿state-dependent￿pricing
by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. In our setting, ￿rms face random lump sum costs of
price adjustment, and as a result the timing price changes depends endogenously on the state
of the economy. A feature of our framework is that it nests a variety of alternative pricing
speci￿cations, including the Calvo model and the ￿xed menu cost model as extreme limiting
cases. Other than that, we maintain the basic setup of Benigno and Woodford (2005) who study
optimal monetary policy in the Calvo model. Namely, the monetary authority sets the nominal
interest rate optimally, with money￿ s role being only that of a unit of account. Importantly,
we do not assume that the permanent distortion due to monopolistic competition is o⁄set
through a production subsidy. There are thus two sources of distortion: price stickiness and
monopolistic competition.
Our central ￿nding is that the optimal monetary policy in this environment is practically
identical to the one derived in the much simpler Calvo model. In particular, we demonstrate
analytically that committing to zero in￿ ation in the long run is optimal for a general speci￿-
cation of preferences and of the price-setting strategies followed by ￿rms. Thus, the presence
of a permanent monopolistic distortion does not in itself justify either a positive or a negative
rate of in￿ ation in the long run, and the optimal policy involves a commitment to eventually
bringing down in￿ ation to zero. Moreover, we ￿nd that the optimal short-run stabilization
policy can be characterized as ￿price stability￿ . The responses to aggregate productivity and
to government expenditure shocks are virtually the same as those under Calvo pricing.6
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1 Introduction
A key normative question in monetary economics concerns the optimal design of monetary
policy in the presence of nominal price rigidity. An extensive literature has studied this question
under the assumption that the timing of price changes is given exogenously, as in the Calvo
(1983) model with Poisson arrival of price adjustment opportunities.1 Undoubtedly a useful
￿rst step, this literature is nonetheless subject to the Lucas (1976) critique in the sense that
the timing of price changes in principle should not be treated as independent of policy.
We extend the analysis of optimal monetary policy to a model of state-dependent pricing
by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Our price-setting framework assumes the presence of
stochastic lump sum costs of adjustment a la Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), and is similar
to the generalized Ss frameworks adopted by Caballero and Engel (2007) and Costain and
Nakov (2008). A feature of these frameworks is that they nest a variety of alternative pricing
speci￿cations, including the Calvo model and the ￿xed menu cost model as extreme limiting
cases. Apart for pricing being state-dependent, we maintain the basic setup of Benigno and
Woodford (2005) who study optimal monetary policy in the Calvo model. Namely, the monetary
authority sets the nominal interest rate optimally, with money￿ s role being only that of a unit of
account.2 Unlike Clarida et. al. (1999), Woodford (2002), or Yun (2005), we do not assume that
the static distortion due to monopolistic competition is o⁄set through a production subsidy.
There are thus two sources of distortion: price stickiness and monopolistic competition.
Our central ￿nding is that the optimal monetary policy in this environment is practically
identical to the one derived in the much simpler Calvo model. In particular, in section 3 we
demonstrate analytically that committing to zero in￿ ation in the long run is optimal for a
general speci￿cation of preferences and of the distribution of menu costs. This generalizes the
result of Benigno and Woodford (2005) regarding the optimality of zero steady-state in￿ ation
1E.g. Clarida et. al. (1999), Woodford (2002), Yun (2005), Benigno and Woodford (2005).
2As in Woodford (2003), the plan is optimal from a ￿timeless perspective￿ , that is, it ignores the policymakers￿
incentives to behave in a special way in the initial few periods, exploiting the fact that private sector expectations
had been set prior to the plan￿ s starting date. In the long-run, the ￿timeless perspective￿plan converges to the
standard Ramsey optimal policy under commitment.
in the Calvo model. Then, in section 4, we assume functional forms for preferences and the
distribution of menu costs, and calibrate our model economy. We ￿nd that the optimal sta-
bilization policy around the zero in￿ ation steady-state can be characterized as price stability.
The impulse-responses to aggregate productivity and government expenditure shocks are vir-
tually the same (to a second-order approximation) as those under Calvo pricing. Moreover, a
￿rst-order approximation delivers responses which are basically identical to the ones obtained
with a second-order approximation.7
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Our results contrast with recent work by Lie (2009) who also studies optimal monetary policy
under state-dependent pricing. Speci￿cally, Lie ￿nds that under state-dependent pricing it is
desirable to let in￿ ation vary more than under Calvo pricing. The reason for this discrepancy
stems from the fact that Lie considers in addition a monetary distortion, which implies a
negative long-run rate of in￿ ation, whereas the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation is zero in our
￿cashless￿economy. We thus conclude that, although a di⁄erence between exogenous-timing
and state-dependent pricing models may arise in the presence of distortions implying a non-
zero long run rate of in￿ ation, at least in the cashless-limit case the main normative results of
exogenous timing models carry over to an economy in which pricing is state-dependent.
2 Model
There are three types of agents: households, ￿rms, and a monetary authority.
2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes the expected ￿ ow of period utility u(Ct) ￿ x(Nt);













t Bt = WtNt + Bt￿1 + ￿t;
where Ct is basket of di⁄erentiated goods i 2 [0;1]; of quantity Cit and price Pit; Nt denotes
hours worked and Wt the nominal wage rate; Bt are nominally riskless bonds with price R
￿1
t ,
and ￿t are the pro￿ts of ￿rms owned by the household, net of lump-sum taxes.
The ￿rst order conditions are
u








where wt ￿ Wt=Pt is the real wage, ￿t ￿ Pt=Pt￿1 is gross in￿ ation, and the aggregate price
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2.2 Firms
The ￿rm￿ s production function is
yit = ztnit;
where zt is an exogenous aggregate productivity process. The ￿rm￿ s labor demand thus equals
nit = yit=zt and its real cost function is wtyit=zt. The real marginal cost common to all ￿rms
is therefore wt=zt. Optimal allocation of expenditure among product varieties by households
implies that each individual ￿rm faces a downward sloping demand schedule for its good, given
by yit = (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ yt:
Following Dotsey et. al. (1999), we assume that ￿rms face random physical costs of adjusting
prices (￿menu costs￿ ), distributed i.i.d. across ￿rms and over time. Let G(￿) and g(￿) denote,
respectively, the cumulative distribution function and the probability density function of the
stochastic menu cost. We allow for the possibility that a positive random fraction of ￿rms
draws a zero menu cost, so that G(0) > 0. Assuming that ￿ is measured in units of labor time,
the total cost paid by a ￿rm changing its price is wt￿.3
Let v0t denote the value of a ￿rm that adjusts its price in period t before subtracting the
menu cost. Let vjt (P) denote the value of a ￿rm which has kept its nominal price unchanged
at the level P in the last j periods. This ￿rm will change its nominal price only if the value of
adjustment, v0t￿wt￿, exceeds the value of continuing with the current price, vjt (P). Therefore,
from each vintage j = 1;:::;J￿1 only those ￿rms with a menu cost draw ￿ ￿ (v0t ￿ vjt (P))=wt
will choose to change their price. The real value of an adjusting ￿rm is given by
v0t = max
P






v0;t+1 ￿ v1;t+1 (P)
wt+1
￿

























is the ￿rm￿ s real pro￿t as a function of its nominal price P, and




3Alternatively, one can assume that ￿ is measured in terms of the basket of ￿nal goods, in which case the
total cost paid by a ￿rm changing its price is simply ￿. The results are not dependent on this assumption.9
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vjt ￿ vjt(P ￿
t￿j) for short. This pricing decision is analogous to the one in the Calvo model, with
the term
Qj





C is the constant adjustment probability


























t ￿ P ￿
t =Pt is the optimal relative price.
2.3 Market clearing
Labor input is required both for the production of goods and for the process of changing prices.
Labor demand for production by ￿rm i is nit = yit=zt = (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ yt=zt. Thus, total labor
demand for production purposes equals ￿tyt=zt, where ￿t ￿
R 1
0 (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ di denotes relative
price dispersion. At the same time, the total amount of labor used by vintage-j ￿rms for pricing
purposes equals  jt
R (v0t￿vjt)=wt
0 ￿g (￿)dk, where  jt is the measure of ￿rms in vintage j.










And equilibrium in the goods market requires that
Yt = Ct + Gt; (9)
where government consumption Gt is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process.
2.4 In￿ ation, price dispersion, and price distribution dynamics
Absent ￿rm-level shocks, all ￿rms adjusting at time t choose the same nominal price, P ￿
t .
Under the assumption that no nominal price survives for longer than J periods, the ￿nite set







. Let  jt denote the time-
t fraction of ￿rms with beginning-of-period nominal price P ￿
t￿j, for j = 1;2;:::;J, such that
PJ














￿1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿jt) jt;
where adjustment probabilities ￿jt, j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1, are given by (6), and where ￿J;t = 1.













(1 ￿ ￿jt) jt: (10)11
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(1 ￿ ￿jt) jt; (11)
where again ￿J;t = 1. The distribution of beginning-of-period prices evolves according to
 j;t = (1 ￿ ￿j￿1;t￿1) j￿1;t￿1 (12)
for j = 2;:::;J, and
 1t = 1 ￿
PJ
j=2  j;t =
PJ
j=1 ￿j;t￿1 j;t￿1 = ￿1;t￿1 1;t￿1 + ￿2;t￿1 2;t￿1 + ::: +  J;t￿1: (13)
2.5 Equilibrium










j=1. The equilibrium conditions are (1), (2), the J ￿ 1










































[￿v0;t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ vt+1];
plus a speci￿cation of monetary policy. If we were to close the model with a Taylor rule, this
would give us a total of 2+(J ￿ 1)+5+J +J +1 = 7+3J equations. We will, however, focus
on optimal policy, which will essentially double the number of equations and variables.
2.5.1 Flexible price equilibrium





zt Pt in each period t. All relative prices are one: p￿
t = P ￿
t =Pt = 1. The equilibrium12
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and so we obtain the classical decoupling of real and nominal variables. The ￿ exible-price
output Y
fp
t derived above is used in de￿ning the output gap as the di⁄erence between actual
output and its ￿ exible price counterpart.
3 Optimal monetary policy problem








; j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1;
that is, the accumulated in￿ ation between periods t￿j and t. This implies
Qj







k=0 (1 ￿ ￿j￿k;t￿k); j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1;
which in turn implies
Qj
k=1 (1 ￿ ￿k;t+k) = ￿
acc
j;t+j. These de￿nitions allow us to express the



























k=0 ￿t￿k by ￿acc
jt in the laws of motion of in￿ ation and price dispersion,








j￿1;t￿1; j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1;
￿
acc
jt = (1 ￿ ￿jt)￿
acc
j￿1;t￿1; j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1;
where the recursions start with ￿acc
0;t￿1 = 1 and ￿
acc
0;t￿1 = 1, respectively. In addition, we use
the constraint Yt = Ct + Gt to substitute for Ct in the equilibrium conditions. At time 0, the
central bank chooses the state-contingent path for all endogenous variables which maximizes13
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0 (Yt ￿ Gt) ￿ vjtu
































0 (Yt ￿ Gt) ￿ vJ￿1;tu







































Since the nominal interest rate only appears in the consumption Euler equation, the latter is
excluded from the set of constraints on the Ramsey problem. Instead, this equation is used
residually to back out the nominal interest rate path consistent with the optimal allocation.
The ￿rst order conditions of the above problem are given in Appendix A.
4 Optimal long run goal: zero in￿ ation
In Appendix B we prove that the Ramsey problem has a steady-state in which in￿ ation is zero.
This generalizes the result of Benigno and Woodford (2005) obtained for the Calvo model to
a state-dependent setting. Namely, the presence of a static monopolistic distortion does not
justify either a positive or a negative rate of in￿ ation in the long run, and the optimal policy
involves a commitment to eventually eliminating any ine¢ cient price dispersion due to nominal
price rigidity. The key insight of the Calvo framework, about the desirability of zero long-run
in￿ ation, therefore, survives in the more general case of state-dependent pricing.
To better understand this result, let us consider the di⁄erent welfare e⁄ects of in￿ ation in
steady state. First, in the presence of price stickiness, in￿ ation increases the extent of price14
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dispersion in the economy. This is ine¢ cient as it increases the amount of labor e⁄ort needed
to produce any given amount of output, and hence it lowers welfare. Second, a commitment
to positive in￿ ation raises the in￿ ation expectations of price-setters. The latter shifts the
Phillips curve upwards, worsening the short-run trade-o⁄between output and in￿ ation. Third,
holding constant future in￿ ation expectations, a rise in current in￿ ation raises output towards
its socially e¢ cient level, thus reducing the monopolistic distortion and improving welfare. It
turns out that at zero in￿ ation, the marginal welfare cost of a small increase in in￿ ation exactly
o⁄sets the marginal welfare bene￿t. As a result, it is optimal to commit to eventually reaching
zero in￿ ation in the absence of aggregate shocks.
Indeed, the welfare e⁄ects of steady state in￿ ation are analogous to the ones in exogenous-
timing models of price adjustment, such as the Calvo or the Taylor model. In our state-
dependent pricing framework, trend in￿ ation a⁄ects the value functions of ￿rms in each vintage,
by a⁄ecting their steady-state relative price and hence their pro￿ts. One might think that this
would in￿ uence the steady-state price adjustment probabilities, which in turn would a⁄ect both
the position of the Phillips curve and the total amount of resources used in pricing activities.
However, the fact that price-setting ￿rms choose their prices optimally implies that, at zero
in￿ ation, a marginal increase in in￿ ation has no e⁄ect on ￿rms￿pro￿ts and hence on adjustment
probabilities. Therefore, the reasons for which zero steady state in￿ ation is optimal in the
exogenous-timing models continue to hold in a state-dependent pricing framework.
Importantly, the above result is independent of the speci￿cation of preferences, or of the
shape of the menu cost distribution. The key assumption is that of a ￿cashless economy￿ , that
is, the absence of a monetary friction which pushes optimal in￿ ation towards the negative of
the real interest rate. In this respect our analysis di⁄ers from that of Lie (2009) who considers
explicitly a monetary distortion.4
5 Optimal stabilization policy: price stability
In this section we analyze the optimal stabilization policy in our economy. We illustrate this
by showing the optimal dynamic responses of several key variables to two types of shocks: to
aggregate productivity and to government consumption. Our main ￿nding is that, under a
second-order approximation to the general equilibrium dynamics of the model, these responses
are identical to the ones obtained in the Calvo model. Moreover, the responses are essentially
the same when approximating to ￿rst rather than to second order.
4Lie argues that monetary frictions are needed to ensure ￿niteness of the number of vintages. Indeed, trend
de￿ ation induced by monetary frictions together with the assumption of an upper bound on menu costs imply
an endogenous ￿nite number of price vintages in steady state. In contrast, under zero in￿ ation ￿rms￿prices
never drift away from the optimum and therefore the number of ￿vintages￿in principle must grow over time.
We circumvent this issue by simply assuming a ￿nite (but arbitrarily large) number of vintages, as a useful
approximation to a ￿true model￿with in￿nite vintages.15
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5.1 Calibration
To produce impulse responses we must specify functional forms and assign values to the model￿ s
parameters. We take most of the parameters from Golosov and Lucas (2007). In particular,
u(Ct) = C
1￿￿
t =(1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ = 2; and x(Nt) = ￿N
1+’
t =(1 + ’) with ￿ = 6 and ’ = 1: The
discount factor is ￿ = 1:04￿1=4 and the elasticity of substitution among product varieties is
￿ = 7.





where both ￿ and ￿ are positive parameters. Therefore, from equation (6) the fraction of







￿ + (v0t ￿ vjt)=wt
￿ + (v0t ￿ vjt)=wt
:
As in Costain and Nakov (2008), this function is increasing in the gain from adjustment v0t￿vjt
and is bounded above by 1. Unlike Costain and Nakov (2008), the function is bounded below
not by 0 but by ￿=￿ > 0: We make this technical assumption to ensure a unique stationary
distribution of ￿rms over the (￿nite number of) price vintages even with zero steady-state
in￿ ation. We are free to choose any arbitrarily small ￿ and so we pick the value 1e ￿ 10.
We then set ￿ = 0:0006 so that, under a policy targeting 2% in￿ ation (consistent with the
average observed rate in the US since the mid-1980￿ s) the model produces an average frequency
of price changes of once every three quarters (consistent with the micro evidence found e.g.
by Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). With these settings, the model implies virtually zero
probability of adjustment when the gain from adjustment is zero. Finally, we set the maximum
price duration to J = 24 quarters, a number which is much greater than any observed price
duration in recent US evidence.
Figure 1 shows the adjustment hazard function and the distribution of ￿rms by price vintage
with 2% trend in￿ ation. In the left panel, the adjustment probability increases rapidly with
price age, reaching 90% after ten quarters. As shown in the right panel, this implies that
virtually no price survives for longer than eight quarters.
We focus on two types of shock. One is an aggregate technology shock with persistence ￿z =
0:95 and the other is a government expenditure shock with persistence ￿g = 0:9: Government
expenditure is calibrated so that it accounts for roughly 17% of GDP in steady-state, consistent
with US postwar experience. In Section 5 on robustness, we discuss the e⁄ects of cost-push and
idiosyncratic shocks.16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1250
October 2010
5.2 Impulse-responses under the optimal policy
We use a second-order Taylor expansion to approximate the equilibrium dynamics of our model.
Figure 2 plots the responses of several variables of interest to two independent shocks: a 1%
improvement in aggregate technology, and a 1% increase in the level of government spending.
Characteristically, four variables ￿the optimal reset price, in￿ ation, and price dispersion (shown
in the last row of the ￿gure), and the output gap, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between actual
output and its ￿ exible price counterpart (and shown in the third panel on the top row), remain
completely constant in response to each of the shocks. In fact, this is precisely what happens
in response to the same shocks in the Calvo model (not shown due to the overlap, but available
on request). Moreover, the responses of the interest rate, consumption, hours worked and
wages, all coincide (up to a second order approximation) with their counterparts in the Calvo
model. While this constitutes no formal proof, it is strongly indicative of the optimality of
price stability in our framework.
What is the intuition for this result? There are four potential ine¢ ciencies in the present
model, related to: (1) the level and volatility of price dispersion; (2) the volatility of the average
markup; (3) the waste of resources due to menu costs; and (4) the level of the average markup
due to imperfect competition. Distortions (1) to (3) are directly related to the friction in
price-setting, and, absent idiosyncratic shocks, a policy of price stability eliminates all three by
eliminating the incentives for price adjustment, thus replicating the ￿ exible price equilibrium.
The fourth ine¢ ciency is a static markup distortion due to monopolistic competition. As
we have already shown in the previous section, the optimal Ramsey plan does not involve
a correction of this ine¢ ciency because it is outweighed by the gains of committing to zero
in￿ ation and achieving the minimum possible price dispersion in the long run, independently of
the particular Ss price-setting policies followed by ￿rms. Figure 2 shows that the central bank￿ s
incentives to deviate from zero in￿ ation so as to reduce monopolistic distortions are virtually
inexistent also in response to real shocks.
In passing we note that a ￿rst-order accurate solution of the model yields virtually iden-
tical impulse-responses, both under Calvo and under stochastic menu costs, at least for small
aggregate shocks.5 We thus ￿nd that the simple linear Calvo framework o⁄ers a very good ap-
proximation to the behavior of a cashless state-dependent pricing economy under the optimal
monetary policy rule.
Our ￿nding is in contrast with Lie (2009) who also studies optimal monetary policy with
state-dependent pricing. Speci￿cally, Lie ￿nds that in a stochastic menu cost environment
it is desirable to let in￿ ation vary more than with Calvo pricing. Since the only substantial
di⁄erence between our models is the fact that he considers in addition a monetary distortion
(implying a negative long-run rate of in￿ ation), we are led to conclude that the discrepancy
5We use 24 vintages when approximating the solution to ￿rst order, and 8 vintages when approximating it
to second order. When plotted, the two sets of impulse-responses are practically indistinguishable to the naked
eye.17
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in our results stems entirely from the fact that we study a ￿cashless￿economy in which the
optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation is zero.
6 Robustness
6.1 Cost-push shocks
The two shocks which we analyze in the previous section (to productivity and to government
spending) involve virtually no trade-o⁄ between stabilizing prices and stabilizing the output
gap (the di⁄erence between output and its e¢ cient level).6 However, a number of economists
argue that an important source of aggregate ￿ uctuations are the so-called ￿cost-push￿shocks.
As a robustness check, we introduce such a shock as a multiplicative disturbance to the reset
price p￿
t as de￿ned in equation (7). The disturbance is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1)
process with persistence ￿￿ = 0:8:
Figure 3 plots the responses to this shock in the Calvo and in the stochastic menu cost
model. In the Calvo model there is a small transitory rise in in￿ ation accompanied by a
temporary fall in consumption and the output gap. Yet, price dispersion remains virtually
constant under the optimal policy. We ￿nd that the latter is true also in the stochastic menu
cost model, namely, price dispersion is una⁄ected by the cost-push shock. However, there are
important quantitative di⁄erences with the Calvo model in the responses of other variables.
In particular, while in￿ ation still rises and consumption drops on impact, in both cases the
initial e⁄ect is much smaller, but more persistent, than in the Calvo model. Interestingly, and
contrary to the Calvo model, with stochastic menu costs output initially rises above its ￿ exible
price level, opening a positive output gap, which impact however is quickly reversed within a
couple of quarters, followed by a persistently lower level of output compared to its ￿ exible price
counterpart.
6.2 Firm-level shocks
For tractability the above analysis abstracts from the presence of ￿rm-level shocks despite the
strong evidence in favor of their existence (e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, Golosov and Lucas,
2007). Yet, we would argue that the mere existence of such shocks does not necessarily imply
very di⁄erent monetary policy recommendations.
With state-dependent pricing, monetary policy has the additional channel of improving real
allocations by increasing ￿rms￿likelihood of adjusting their prices. On the other hand, the
existence of ￿rm level shocks implies that replicating the ￿ exible price equilibrium is no longer
feasible. In particular, actual price dispersion would di⁄er from the e¢ cient (non-degenerate)
one under any monetary policy that fails to trigger continuous price adjustment by all ￿rms.
6In fact they do involve a tiny tradeo⁄, but it is so small that the deviations of the price level from steady-state
are on the order of 1/1000th of a basis point.18
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7 Conclusion
We have shown that the main lessons for optimal monetary policy derived in the canonical
Calvo model carry over to a more general setup in which ￿rms￿probability of changing prices
depends on the state of the economy. In particular, the optimal long run rate of in￿ ation is
zero, and the optimal stabilization policy can be characterized as ￿price stability￿ . This means
that, in the long run, the central bank should not try to o⁄set the static distortion arising from
monopolistic competition by varying the rate of in￿ ation.
The above result lends support to more informal statements about the suitability of the
Calvo model for optimal monetary policy exercises despite its apparent con￿ ict with the Lucas
(1976) critique.20
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Appendices
A. First order conditions of the monetary policy problem
Each expression below is a ￿rst order condition with respect to the variable in parenthesis on
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where we have used that Yt ￿ Gt = Ct and de￿ned Ljt ￿ (v0t ￿ vjt)=wt for compactness.
B. Optimality of zero long run in￿ ation
We now prove that the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem are satis￿ed in a steady
state with zero in￿ ation. We start by guessing that ￿ss = 1, which implies p￿
ss = ￿ss = 1 and
￿acc
j;ss = 1 for all j. It is easy to show that under zero in￿ ation all price vintages have the same
value: vj;ss = v0;ss =
Yss=￿
1￿￿ = ￿ vss for all j, where have used the fact that the real wage equals
wss = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ and therefore real pro￿ts are given by (1 ￿ wss)Yss = Yss=￿. The adjustment
gain is then zero for every vintage, implying ￿j;ss = G(0) ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0 for all j. From the laws of
motion of the vintage distribution, we then have  j;ss =
￿




1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿j￿1  1;ss, for
j = 2;:::;J, which combined with
PJ
j=1  j;ss = 1 implies
 j;ss =
￿





1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿j ￿ ￿  j;




1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿j for each j = 1;:::;J ￿ 1. This completes the charac-
terization of the steady-state equilibrium of the endogenous variables other than the Lagrange
multipliers of the Ramsey problem.
We now need to show that the ￿rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem are satis￿ed
too in the steady state with zero in￿ ation. Notice that there are 3 + 5J ￿rst order conditions
but only 2 + 5J Lagrange multipliers (see Appendix A). Therefore, we will use 2 + 5J ￿rst
order conditions in order to solve for the steady-state Lagrange multipliers and then check
whether the remaining equation holds given the solution for all the other variables. Consider
now the ￿rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem in the steady state with zero in￿ ation24
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Fig.1: Price adjustment probability and firm distribution by vintage
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Fig.3: Responses to a cost−push shock
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